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“The Belt and Road” and Cross-Border Judicial Cooperation 
Zheng Sophia Tang* 
The Belt and Road Initiative (B&R) is aimed at fostering “peace, development, cooperation 
and mutual benefit” among Asia, Europe and Africa, with China as a hub. It is expected to 
improve connectivity and increase cross-border civil and commercial activities of companies 
and individuals in this region. The success of B&R requires improving certainty and 
predictability for cross-border players by removing legal obstacles generated by the 
existence of different legal and judicial systems.  This article proposes the judicial 
cooperation approach over harmonisation, explains how a properly developed judicial 
cooperation scheme could assist the success of the B&R initiative and which method is most 
effective in improving judicial cooperation in this region. The article’s recommendations 
draw on a survey and comparative study of cross-border judicial cooperation in 69 B&R 
countries in applicable law, jurisdiction, judicial assistance and judgment enforcement. It 
reveals that judicial cooperation between B&R countries is achieved partially through 
international treaties, partially by bilateral agreements and mostly through unilateral 
domestic law. The status quo is extremely complicated, piecemeal, unpredictable and largely 
ineffective. After analysing the pros and cons of international, bilateral and national 
approaches, this article suggests that the most effective way to improve judicial cooperation 
between B&R countries is an informal, China-led, regional approach. China would act as a 
role model, a facilitator, a dispute centre and a sign-poster in this process. 
 
1. Introduction 
The “Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road”, in abbreviation, 
“the Belt and Road” or “B&R” was proposed by the Chinese President Xi Jingping in 2013,1 
aiming at fostering “peace, development, cooperation and mutual benefit” among Asia, 
                                                          
* Chair in Law and Commerce, School of Law, Newcastle University, UK.  
1 The Chinese abbreviation for this initiative is 一带一路 [Yi Dai Yi Lu]. According to the guidance of the 
Leading Group on the Construction of the Belt and Road, the officially recommended translation abbreviation is 
“the Belt and Road”, “B&R” or “the Belt and Road Initiative”. Other forms of translation are not recommended. 
See “The Formal English Translation of the Belt and Road” (in Chinese), available at 
https://www.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/ztindex.htm (visited 10 May 2017). The “Silk Road Economic Belt” connects Asia 
with Europe, the Mediterranean Sea, the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean, aiming at building a new Eurasian 
Land Bridge and three international economic cooperation corridors. The “21st-Century Maritime Silk Road” 
connects China’s coast with South Pacific, and Europe through South China Sea and Indian Ocean, focusing on 
building more efficient maritime transport route. For more introductions, see National Development and Reform 
Commission, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Commerce of the PRC, with State Council 
authorisation, “Vision and Proposed Actions Outlined on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-
Century Maritime Silk Road” (Action Plan), March 2015 [国家发展与改革委员会、外交部和商务部,<共同
建设丝绸之路经济带和 21 世纪海上丝绸之路的愿景和行动>]; Zeng Lingliang, “Conceptual Analysis of 
China’s Belt and Road Initiative” (2016) 15 Chinese Journal of International Law 517; M Du, “China’s ‘One 
Belt, One Road’ Initiative: Context, Focus, Institutions, and Implications” (2016) 2 Chinese Journal of Global 
Governance 30; H Yu, “Motivation behind China’s ‘One Belt, One Road’ Initiatives and Establishment of the 
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank” (2017) 26 Journal of Contemporary China 353. 
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Europe and Africa, with China as a hub.2 This ambitious initiative reinforces the Chinese 
opening-up policy. Its core is to strengthen connectivity between China and Eurasian 
countries. It is well understood that connectivity by smoothing transportation helps to fix 
spatial limitation and reduce transaction costs. Building the economic belt and corridors 
would facilitate the movement of goods, services, people and capital, assisting regional trade 
and economic development.3 Although the B&R initiative is generated with a view to boost 
China’s economic growth, this plan could only be successful with the contribution of other 
countries alongside of the belt and road and other foreign neighbours and partners. China 
describes this initiative as “open and inclusive” and welcomes participation of all countries of 
the world.4 
The B&R initiative was enforced from 2015. It is too early to assess its success and its 
influence and impact in China, Eurasia and the rest of the world. However, it is reasonable to 
anticipate that, the B&R would encourage more cross-border transactions, investment and 
communication between individuals and companies in China and other B&R countries. The 
increasing interactions in the regional cooperation would lead to the requirement for more 
predictable law and regulation that could provide certainty and predictability to individuals 
and businesses. 5  This objective could be achieved through two means. The first is the 
harmonisation approach which relies on uniform substantive law governing civil and 
commercial matters among participating countries, and a uniform supranational judicial 
system to hear transnational disputes. This approach is too ambitious to be realistic. The 
second approach which this article proposes is a judicial cooperation approach. Judicial 
cooperation is narrowly defined in this article to cover jurisdiction, applicable law, mutual 
judicial assistance and mutual enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters 
between difference states. This approach maintains the diversity of domestic civil and 
commercial law of every participating country but focuses on addressing legal conflict and 
                                                          
2 Zeng Lingliang (n 1 above). 
3 See, in general, Summers; H Yu (n 1 above). 
4 “Action Plan” s VIII, para 1. 
5 It is true that many transactions go through without legal problems and businessmen usually could use their 
own way, such as private contract and business customs, to mitigate the uncertainty associated in the diversity of 
legal systems in transnational commerce. See Arthur S Hartkamp, “Modernisation and Harmonization of 
Contract Law” (2003) 8 Uniform Law Review 81. The needs for law reform is not urgent at the beginning. 
However, as cross-border relationship becomes more intensive, the weakness of the lack of predictable law will 
emerge to hamper the continuous development of economy. Law and economic development interacts. See 
Boris Kozolchyk, “Modernization of Commercial Law: International Uniformity and Economic Development” 
(2009) 34 Brooklyn Journal of International Law 709; Michael Trebilcock and Jing Leng, “The Role of Formal 
Contract Law and Enforcement in Economic Development” (2006) 92 Virginia Law Review 1517; Norman L 
Greene, “Perspectives from the Rule of Law and International Economic Development” (2008) 86 Denver 
University Law Review 53. 
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judicial cooperation from the conflict of laws perspective. Section 2 justifies the judicial 
cooperation approach over harmonisation and explains how a properly developed judicial 
cooperation scheme could assist the success of the B&R initiative. Section 3 examines the 
current judicial cooperation among B&R countries. Section 4 examines the potential 
approaches to improve judicial cooperation among B&R countries. Section 5 concludes. 
2. B&R and Cross-Border Judicial Cooperation 
Sixty-nine countries including China are involved in B&R and the number is likely to 
continuously grow as the project progresses.6 Although the needs for legal certainty will not 
be extremely strong at the beginning as sophisticated businessmen would use other means, 
such as contracts and negotiation, to mitigate commercial risk and resolve uncertainty and 
disputes, more intensive connections and more frequent transactions inevitably call for more 
predictable and reliable law which helps private parties to better predict the legal 
consequences of their cross-border activities and resolve disputes.7 
(a) Harmonisation of Substantive Law and Procedure 
Transnational legal certainty may be achieved by harmonisation of substantive law. However, 
harmonisation in B&R countries is impractical, unrealistic and difficult. First, B&R is an 
ambitious initiative, covering the cooperation in almost all civil and commercial matters.8 
The initiative starts from infrastructure building, centres on promoting trade, finance and 
economic cooperation, and extends to other fields, such as education, culture and 
communication.9 It may be possible to enter into an umbrella framework agreement on the 
shared interests and principles, but it would be extremely difficult to establish detailed 
harmonised rules that intend to regulate rights and obligations of individuals and businesses 
in all the above fields. 
The existing international uniform commercial laws may reduce commercial risk and 
uncertainty in B&R. International Conventions exist in sale of goods, carriage of goods by 
sea, negotiable instruments, letter of credit and air carriage.10 A large number of soft laws 
                                                          
6  According to the information provided by the Belt and Road Portal, available at 
https://eng.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/info/iList.jsp?cat_id=10076 (visited 10 May 2017). 
7 D Chen and S Deakin, “On Heaven’s Lathe” (2015) 8 Law and Development Review 123–145. See also works 
referred to in note 5. 
8 This may include trade, services, finance, investment, technology, transportation, education, communication 
and cultural exchange. Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Commerce of PRC, “Action Plan”, Ch IV. 
9 Ibid. 
10  The UN Convention on International Sale of Goods 1980 regulating parties rights and obligations in 
international sale of goods transactions; International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law 
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also exist to enhance certainty,11 which can be incorporated into contracts to unify practice 
and interpretation. The international model laws and principles also help to improve 
harmonisation at a certain level.12 
However, the international harmonisation on substantive law is unlikely to provide a 
complete and satisfactory solution. First, international harmonisation cannot cover all the 
areas of law relevant in transnational activities. For example, there is no globally harmonised 
law on the transfer of property and proprietary rights; cross-border banking and financing 
services; cross-border insolvency; enforcement of IP rights; consumer law; employment law; 
and insurance law. Furthermore, international harmonisation primarily exists in commercial 
areas. Civil matters, such as contract, tort, marriage, family, etc., are left untouched.13 Third, 
international harmonisation may not be implemented in all B&R countries. In particular, a 
large number of B&R countries are not widely open to the international society and are 
underdeveloped in internationalisation of substantive law.14 These countries are not actively 
involved in negotiation, ratification or accession of international harmonised law. For 
example, although the CISG is one of the most successful international conventions on cross-
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Relating to Bills of Lading 1924 (Hague Rules), the Hague–Visby Rules, the UN Convention on the Carriage of 
Goods by Sea 1978 (Hamburg Rules) and the UN convention on Contracts for the International Carriage of 
Goods Wholly or Partly by Sea 2008 (Rotterdam Rules), which provide minimum responsibilities for ship 
owners in international carriage of goods by sea; the UN Convention on International Bills of Exchange and 
International Promissory Notes 1988 that regulates international payment by financial instruments; UN 
Convention on Independent Guarantees and Stand-By Letters of Credit 1995 that covers certain issues in 
international payment by letter of credit; Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to 
International Carriage by Air 1929 (Warsaw Convention) and its amendments; and the Montreal Convention 
1999 to address liabilities of international air carriers. 
11 Such as the Uniform customs and Practice for Documentary Credits (UCP600) and Incoterms. 
12 Such as UNCITRAL Model Law on Secured Transactions (2016); UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border 
Insolvency (1997); UNCITRAL Model Law on International Credit Transfers (1992); UNCITRAL Model Law 
on Electronic Transferable Records (2017); UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Signatures (2001); 
UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce (1996); UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial 
Contracts (2016); UNIDROIT Model Law on Leasing (2008). See S Gopalan, “Transnational Commercial Law: 
The Way Forward” (2003) 18 American University International Law Review 803, 817–819. 
13 Harmonisation of civil law is better attempted at the regional instead of international level. The EU has 
worked to harmonise civil law matters, including contract law and family law, but it is generally not very 
successful. For more discussion, see Masha Antokolskaia, “The ‘Better Law’ Approach and the Harmonization 
of Family Law” (2006) VI European Journal of Law Reform 159; Masha Antokolskaia, “Harmonization of 
Substantive Family Law in Europe” (2010) 22 Child and Family Law Quarterly 397; Haris Tagaras, “European 
Harmonization of Tort Law” (2005) 58 Revue Hellenigue de Droit International 1; Klaus Peter Berger, 
“Harmonization of European Contract Law — The Influence of Comparative Law” (2001) 50 ICLQ 877; Marc 
Picat and Stessie Soccio, “Harmonization of European Contract Law: Fiction or Reality” (2011) International 
Business Law Journal 371. 
14 Arman Mazhikeyev, T Huw Edwards and Marian Rizov, “Openness and Isolation: The Trade Performance of 
the Former Soviet Central Asian Countries” (2015) 24 International Business Review 935; Arman Mazhikeyev 
and T Tuw Edwards, “Central Asian Trade Relations in the Post-Soviet Era”, available at 
http://www.etsg.org/ETSG2013/Papers/126.pdf (visited 10 October 2017); Jack McMahon, “Rule of Law in 
Central Asia” (2001) 44 Advocate (Idaho State Bar) 13; Nawal K Paswan, “Investment Cooperation in Central 
Asia” (2013) 69 India Quarterly 13. 
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border transactions, with 85 contracting parties, it has not been ratified by 36 B&R 
countries.15 One of the oppositions from many Middle East countries is that CISG rules, 
especially those in relation to interests, are incompatible with Islamic jurisprudence.16 The 
lack of Islamic elements is also present in many other substantive law treaties, which makes 
future ratification difficult. Finally, international harmonisation would only exist in the area 
of law, but not in judiciary or judicial practice. It is unrealistic to establish a supranational 
court to hear all cross-border civil and commercial disputes. The harmonisation approach, 
therefore, could not help in terms of dispute resolution. 
Not only international harmonisation but also regional harmonisation of substantive law 
proves unrealistic. The ambitious B&R initiative covers a large number of countries cross 
East Asia, South Asia, Central Asia, West Asia, Europe and Africa, with widely diverse legal 
culture and tradition. Regional harmonisation requires the finding of common core and 
shared legal language cross multiple legal families, including the former soviet-socialist 
law,17 Chinese socialist law,18 French civil law,19 German civil law,20 Islamic law,21 common 
law,22 Hindu law23 and customary law.24  This daunting task may not be achievable as a 
matter of reality. This is the greatest difficulty that prevents successful regional 
harmonisation. Furthermore, the level of development in law varies among B&R countries. 
Some countries, such as New Zealand, Estonia and Singapore, have developed the modern 
legal system; some countries, such as China, Thailand, Malaysia and Vietnam, are in the 
progress of transition and modernisation of their domestic law; however, some other 
countries, such as Cambodia, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Egypt, are subject to criticism for 
                                                          
15  Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Brunei, Cambodia, Czech Republic, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Iran, 
Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Laos, Macedonia, Malaysia, Maldives, Moldova, Myanmar, Nepal, Oman, 
Pakistan, Palestine, Philippines, Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Syria, Tajikistan, 
Thailand, Timor-Leste, Turkmenistan, UAE and Yemen. 
16 See the discussion in Mona Ahadi, “The Adoption of the CISG in Iran: Practical Difficulties in Implementing 
the CISG”, available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/congress/Papers_for_Programme/76-AHADI-
The_Adoption_of_the_CISG_in_Iran.pdf (visited 21 November 2018). 
17 For example, Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan. These countries’ legal 
system is transitioning from soviet law but formal socialist law influence continues to remain. 
18 Such as China. The difference between Chinese socialist and other former soviet law is that Chinese socialist 
law is the combination of the influence of market economy, socialist and Confucianism. 
19 Such as Romania. 
20 For example, Estonia, Latvia, Bosnia, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Slovenia, Serbia and Turkey. 
21 For example, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Iran, Oman, Yemen, Brunei, Qatar, Pakistan, UAE, Iraq, Afghanistan and 
Indonesia. 
22 For example, Malaysia, New Zealand, Pakistan, UAE, Bangladesh, Brunei, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Thailand 
and South Africa. 
23 Such as India. 
24 For example, India, South Africa and Mongolia. 
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underdeveloped rule of law and civil justice systems.25  In the 2016 Rule of Law Index 
published by the World Justice Project, these four countries fall within the bottom 10 among 
113 countries and regions in the world,26 raising concerns on constraints on government 
powers, absence of corruption, open government, fundamental rights, order and security, 
regulatory enforcement and civil and criminal justice. Harmonisation of law and uniform 
judicial enforcement among countries with such a big diverse development level in rule of 
law and judicial practice would prove an impossible project. Third, there is no institutional 
infrastructure in Eurasia to facilitate harmonisation. Countries are involved with bilateral 
agreements or announcement. There are no supranational governance bodies and comparable 
legislative and judiciary entities in B&R region to facilitate harmonisation. 
Although the EU regional harmonisation of law is generally successful, it is necessary to 
recall a few fundamental differences between EU and B&R. First, the similar legal tradition 
and culture are generally present in EU Member States, at least before the enlargement to 
include Central and Eastern Member States during 2004 and 2007.27 Although diversities 
exist, for example, the United Kingdom and Ireland follow the common law tradition and 
continental Member States follow the Roman law tradition, the level of diversity is not so 
severe to prevent a proper harmonisation of law. Second, the EU integration is more 
advanced with established supranational governance and legislative bodies. 28  The 
Commission drafts and submits legislative proposals to the European Parliament,29 which 
together with the Council decides whether or not to amend, adopt or reject it. 30  The 
supranational judiciary, the Court of Justice of the European Union, is established to 
encompass judiciary of the whole EU. The whole legislative and enforcement procedure is 
mature and complete. Comparatively, the level of integration is much lower in B&R. 
Countries are involved with bilateral agreements or announcement. There are no 
supranational governance bodies or comparable legislative entities in B&R. Third, even in 
EU, full harmonisation of substantive law is still not achieved; instead, more successful 
harmonisation exists in the area of private international law and judicial cooperation. In terms 
                                                          
25  See, in general, World Justice Project, Rule of Law Index 2016, available at 
http://data.worldjusticeproject.org/ (visited 10 May 2017). 
26 Ibid. 
27 For EU harmonisation, see Catherine Skinner, “Codification and the Common Law” (2009) 11 European 
Journal of Law Reform 225; Walter van Gerven, “A Common Law for Europe: The Future Meeting the Past” 
(2001) 9 European Review of Private Law 485; Petra Weingerl, “The Europeanisation of English Tort Law” 
(2017) 54 Common Market Law Review 658. 
28 TEU Art 17(1); TFEU Art 225; rr 37, 46, 52 and Annex XIII of the Rules of Procedure. 
29 Ibid. 
30 TFEU art 289 and rr 47–49 of the Rules of Procedure. 
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of substantive law, the uniform private and commercial law only exits in a few areas, such as 
consumers,31 company32 and intellectual property right.33 However, some important areas are 
left outside. For example, the Uniform EU contract law project is unsuccessful34 and the later 
EU common sale law also faces difficulty to progress.35 Even in those areas where substantial 
harmonisation has been done, harmonisation cannot be seamless and gaps still exist. For 
example, regardless of numerous EU law on substantive consumer sales, no harmonised rules 
are provided to cover the formation and validity of consumer contracts. It is reasonable to 
argue that the EU harmonisation cannot prove a feasible model for B&R to follow. 
Regional harmonisation of commercial law also exists in Africa. The organisation for the 
Harmonisation of Business Law in Africa (OHBLA, or “OHADA” in French”) has adopted 
numerous uniform Acts on general commercial law,36 contracts for the carriage of goods by 
road,37 commercial companies and economic interest groupings38 and the organisation and 
                                                          
31 The EU harmonised certain standards in protecting general consumers: Directive 2011/83/EU on consumer 
rights, amending Council Directive 93/13/EEC and Directive 1999/44/EC of repealing Council Directive 
85/577/EEC and Directive 97/7/EC, [2011] OJ L 304/260; Directive 2005/29/EC concerning unfair business-to-
consumer commercial practices in the internal market and amending Council Directive 84/450/EEC, Directives 
97/7/EC, 98/27/EC and 2002/65/EC and Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 (Unfair Commercial Practices 
Directive), [2005] OJ L 149/22; law that protects passengers: Regulation (EU) No 1177/2010 concerning the 
rights of passengers when travelling by the sea and inland waterway and amending Regulation (EC) No 
2006/2004, [2010] OJ L 334/142; Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 establishing common rules on compensation 
and assistance to passengers in the event of denied boarding and of cancellation or long delay of flights, and 
repealing Regulation (EEC) No 295/91, [2004] OJ L 46/1; consumers in credit sales: Directive 2008/48/EC on 
credit agreements for consumers and repealing Council Directive 87/102/EEC, [2008] OJ L 133.58. 
32 Directive 2011/35/EU concerning mergers of public limited liability companies, [2011] OJ L 110/1; Directive 
2009/102/EC in the area of company law on single-member private limited liability companies, [2009] OJ L 
258/20; Directive 2007/36/EC on the exercise of certain rights of shareholders in listed companies, [2007] OJ L 
184/17; Regulation (EC) No 1606/2002 on the application of international accounting standards, [2002] OJ L 
243/1. 
33 For example, Directive (EU) 2016/943 on the protection of undisclosed know-how and business information 
(trade secrets) against their unlawful acquisition, use and disclosure, [2016] OJ L 157/1; Directive (EU) 
2015/2436 to approximate the laws of the Member States relating to trade marks, [2015] OJ L 336/1; Directive 
2009/24/EC on the legal protection of computer programs, [2009] OJ L 111/16; Directive 2006/116/EC on the 
term of protection of copyright and certain related rights, [2006] OJ L 372/12; Directive 2001/29/EC on the 
harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society, [2001] OJ L 167/10; 
Directive 98/71/EC on the legal protection of designs, [1998] OJ L 289/28. 
34 The Commission of European Contract Law was formed in 1982 and produced the Principles of European 
Contract Law in 2002, which is not an EU legal instrument but largely an academic work providing model rules 
showing the common core of the European system. See O Lando and H Beale, Principles of European Contract 
Law (Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer, 1999–2003); Y Adar and P Sirena, “Principles and Rules in the Emerging 
European Contract Law” (2013) 9 European Review of Contract Law 1; O Lando, “Principles of European 
Contract Law and Unidroit/Principles: Moving from Harmonization to Unification?” (2003) 8 Uniform Law 
Review 123. 
35 The European Commission submitted the Proposal for a Regulation on a Common European Sales Law 
COM(2011) 0635 final, 2011/0284(COD). In 2015, the Commission abandoned this proposal and decided to 
replace it with a new initiative to remove contractual barriers to cross-border sales, see “Public Consultation on 
Contract Rules for Online Purchases of Digital Content and Tangible Goods”, 12 June 2015. 
36 Adopted on 15 December 2010 in Lome (Togo) and entered into force on 15 May 2011. 
37 Adopted on 22 March 2003 in Yaounde and entered into force on 1 January 2004. 
38 Adopted on 30 January 2014 and entered into force on 5 May 2014. 
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harmonisation of business accounting. 39  These uniform Acts bind 17 Member States of 
OHADA.40 Again, a regional organisation is created to undertake the legislative role and all 
Member States share similar history, culture, tradition and economic needs.41 Most OHADA 
Member States are former French Colonies, heavily influenced by the French law and French 
judicial proceedings. The regional organisation, OHADA, undertakes the legislative law. 
Even so, there is doubt that whether the OHADA may successfully harmonise the 
commercial law of all countries in the continent, because of the culture difference in other 
African countries.42 
The large number of involved countries, the vast diversity of legal culture and tradition, the 
different development and quality of law and judicial system, and the different level of 
economic development in B&R countries make regional harmonisation of civil and 
commercial law an unrealistic option. 
(b) Judicial Cooperation Approach 
Without uniform law and judicial system, cross-border judicial cooperation would be the 
most promising means to provide certainty and predictability. B&R focuses on connectivity 
instead of the European style “integration”.43 That means it would facilitate the cross-border 
flow of goods, people and capital but leave production, political and legal side to every 
individual country. 44  The co-existence of multiple independent legal systems means that 
where cross-border transactions occur and, in particular, disputes arise out of these 
transactions, the governing law, competent court, potential procedure and possibility to 
enforce foreign judgments would be inevitable questions to answer. 
The judicial cooperation approach is based on the mutual understanding that every country 
involved in B&R has the different, separate and independent legal system. It is not necessary 
to have substantive law harmonised among these countries, or to establish a supranational 
                                                          
39 Adopted in Yaounde on 24 March 2000 and entered into force on 1 January 2001. 
40 Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, Congo, Comoros, Gabon, Guinea, 
Guinea Bissau, Equatorial Guinea, Mali, Niger, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Senegal, Chad and Togo. 
41 A Mouloul, Understanding the Organization for the Harmonization of Business Law in Africa (O.H.A.D.A) 
(OHADA, 2nd ed., June 2009); B Fagbayibo, “Towards the Harmonization of Laws in Africa” (2009) 42 
Comparative and International Law Journal of Southern Africa 309; P Winship, “Law and Development in 
West and Central Africa”, SMU Dedman School of Law Legal Studies Research Paper No 272; G Kalm, 
“Building Legal Certainty through International Law: OHADA Law in Cameroon” (Working Paper No 11-005, 
Buffett Center for International and Comparative Studies, 2011); R Beauchard and MJV Kodo, “Can OHADA 
Increase Legal Certainty in Africa?” (Working Paper 17/2011, Justice and Development, 2011). 
42 Fagbayibo (n 41 above) pp 316–319. 
43 See, in general, “Action Plan”. 
44 P Ferdinand, “Westward Ho - the China Dream and ‘One Belt, One Road’: Chinese Foreign Policy under Xi 
Jinping”, (2016) 92 International Affairs 941, 948-950. 
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judiciary for dispute resolution. Certainty can be achieved by providing mechanisms helping 
the parties to predict the potential applicable law and competent court and by facilitating 
cooperation between the courts of different countries to enforce each other’s judgments and 
to ease cross-border procedure. 
For example, without proper judicial cooperation, a country may not allow its court to 
recognise and enforce foreign judgments in civil and commercial matters and require all 
cross-border disputes with the potential enforcement needs to be adjudicated in its courts. If 
this country’s judicial system and commercial law are not advanced, foreign parties could 
encounter potential risk of not being able to enforce their rights if something goes wrong. 
With judicial cooperation, this country may enter into bilateral or multilateral treaties with 
other countries promising to respect each other’s judgments in principle, or unilaterally lower 
the threshold in its domestic law for foreign judgments enforcement. The uncertainty 
concerning the enforceability of judgments would be largely lifted.45 
The other area that also shows clear needs for judicial cooperation is transnational litigation 
procedure. Service of procedure abroad requires effective judicial cooperation between 
relevant countries, without which the court must follow both the law of its own and the local 
law of the foreign country. If one relevant country does not permit more flexible way to serve 
a process, complicated, time-consuming and very inefficient diplomatic approach may have 
to be followed. 46  More difficulty may exist in taking evidence abroad. As most B&R 
countries are civil law countries, they do not allow foreign officials or persons authorised by 
foreign authorities to take evidence in their territory.47 Judicial cooperation provides efficient 
channels for authorities in different countries to assist each other in carrying out certain 
judicial activities in their jurisdiction. For example, a country may permit the foreign court to 
directly serve the defendant in its territory by post; or a country may allow the agent 
authorised by a foreign authority to collect evidence it its territory.48 This would largely 
reduce litigation cost and speed up the process. 
                                                          
45 However, uncertainty will not be completely removed because there usually will be exceptions, subject to 
conflicts of jurisdiction, natural justice, procedural fairness, defendant’s right to defend and, most importantly, 
the ambiguous public policy defence. 
46 Robert Casad, “Service of Process Abroad” (1986) Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law 
93; Gary A Magnarini, “Service of Process Abroad under the Hague Convention” (1988) 71 Marquette Law 
Review 649, 652–657. 
47 Jianxina Gao, “Taking of Evidence Abroad and Its Comparison between Countries of Civil Law and Common 
Law” (1994) 1 Asia Pacific Law Review 116–117. 
48 Ibid., 117–118. 
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In terms of jurisdiction, the lack of judicial cooperation may lead to concurrent proceedings 
over the same cause of action between the same parties. Conflict of jurisdiction may be 
caused by the difference in every country’s domestic jurisdiction rules, but it may also exist 
with harmonised jurisdiction rules. For example, the EU harmonisation of jurisdiction rules 
does not aim to designate just one competent court for one dispute but allows more than one 
court to be competent, which enables the claimant to choose.49 This level of flexibility is 
usually necessary in case a competent court is inappropriate or there is substantial difficulty 
for the claimant to sue in that country. The main goal of judicial cooperation is not to 
harmonise jurisdiction rules by only granting one court competence for one dispute but to 
prevent concurrent proceedings, though harmonised jurisdiction rules would assist higher 
predictability, reduce compliance and learning cost and prevent unnecessary surprise when an 
unexpected court asserts jurisdiction.50 
In terms of governing law, different or unclear choice of law rules in different countries may 
lead to uncertainty to predict the applicable law and may encourage forum shopping. For 
example, if both country A and country B have jurisdiction, while A’s choice of law permits 
the application of the law of country A while country B’s choice of law directs to the law of 
country C. Choosing country A or country B may lead to the different applicable law, and the 
result. The parties thus cannot ascertain their rights and obligations in advance given the 
potentially different applicable law applied by the different court. Judicial cooperation may 
require harmonisation of choice of law rules at certain level, adopting the common principles 
or standards, which may improve certainty and predictability. 
3. Judicial Cooperation: Status Quo 
The status quo of judicial cooperation in the B&R region can be remarked as being 
complicated, largely piecemealed and hardly effective. It does not mean nothing has been 
done to promote jurisdiction cooperation. On the contrary, some B&R countries have joined 
international judicial cooperation/assistance treaties, 51  some countries are active in 
                                                          
49 For example, in a contract dispute, the claimant can sue either in the defendant’s domicile (art 4(1)), or the 
place where the contract is performed (art 7(1)); in a tort dispute, the claimant can also choose between the 
defendant’s domicile (art 4(1)), the place where the tort activity occurred or the place where the damage/harmful 
result occurred (art 7(2)). 
50 For example, in a multinational project where 10 or 20 countries are involved, a company may need to know 
the domestic jurisdiction rules of every country in order to predict which country’s court may be competent in 
order to estimate its potential costs and works to reduce the litigation risks. It generates high compliance and 
learning cost. 
51 See Section 3(c). 
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concluding bilateral judicial cooperation agreements, 52  and most countries have enacted 
relevant domestic law to respect foreign judicial proceedings and foreign law. However, the 
detailed analysis below shows that the existing cooperation is far from being satisfactory and 
cannot achieve the purpose to smooth cross-border transactions between B&R countries. 
(a) Applicable Law 
There is no international or regional achievement on harmonised choice of law rules in cross-
border commercial matters readily applicable in all B&R countries. The Hague Conference 
on Private International Law had indeed made the effort to harmonise choice of law in 
specific areas, but they are not received very well. For example, the protocol on the Law 
Applicable to Maintenance Obligations 2007 applies to 14 B&R countries;53 the Convention 
on the Law Applicable to Traffic Accidents 1971 has 13 B&R signatories;54 5 B&R countries 
succeeded the Convention on the Law Applicable to Products Liability 1973; 55 the 
Convention on the Law Applicable to Trusts and on their Recognition only applies to Hong 
Kong;56 five B&R countries signed the Convention on the Law Applicable to Maintenance 
Obligations 1973;57 only Czech, Moldova and Slovakia signed the Convention on the Law 
Applicable to Contracts for the International Sale of Goods 1986; other Hague choice of law 
conventions receive no official accession or ratification in B&R countries.58 
In 2015, the Hague Conference on Private International Law adopted the Principles on 
Choice of Law in International Commercial Contracts (the Principles) to promote party 
autonomy in commercial contracts.59 The Principles is not a binding instrument or a model 
law, but a set of principles that the Conference encourages individual countries to incorporate 
in their domestic law to assist the reform and modernisation of domestic choice of law 
rules. 60 The Principles could assist the clarification of choice of law questions in B&R 
                                                          
52 See Section 3(d). 
53 Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, 
Slovenia and Ukraine. 
54  Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Czech Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Montenegro, Macedonia, 
Poland, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia and Ukraine. 
55 Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia. 
56 China does not ratify this Convention. This Convention is signed and ratified by the United Kingdom and 
applies to Hong Kong as a result of an extension made by the United Kingdom. It continues to apply to Hong 
Kong after it was restored to China on 1 July 1997. 
57 Albania, Estonia, Lithuania, Poland and Turkey. 
58 Such as Convention on the Law Applicable to Agency 1978; Convention on the Law Applicable to 
Matrimonial Property Regimes 1978; Convention on the Law Applicable to Certain Rights in Respect of 
Securities held with an Intermediary 2006. 
59 The Principles, “Introduction” para I.11 and Preamble para 1. 
60 The Principles, “Introduction” para I.8. 
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countries and, in particular, help the courts of some countries, where no modern choice of law 
system is established, to resolve the applicable law problem in a cross-border contract 
according to the proposed international code of practice.61 
However, the record shows that none of the B&R countries have incorporated the Principles 
in their domestic legislation.62 The Principles is relevantly young and its factual impact is yet 
to be seen. However, it is important to note some points of reality. First, countries that have 
already updated their domestic choice of law rules to respect party autonomy, which works 
generally well in practice, may feel there is no need to reform their domestic law in a short 
term to incorporate the Hague Principles.63 Second, countries that have not yet recognised 
party autonomy may feel difficult to adopt the Principles in their domestic law, especially 
when the Principles are ambitious on some controversial matters and provide innovative rules, 
such as recognition of the choice of non-state law and the uniform rules dealing with the 
battle of the forms.64 Third, although the Principles provides workable “best practice” in 
dealing with party autonomy in commercial contracts, it does not provide choice of law rules 
for contracts in the absence of choice of law agreements.65 
Unofficial regional efforts have also been made to harmonise regional choice of law rules in 
Asia. For example, conflict of laws scholars in 10 East Asian countries have worked in the 
project of Asian Principles of Private International Law (Asian General Principles) that is 
based on the comparative study of the conflict of laws in 10 East and Southeast Asian 
countries.66 This work has summarised similarities of conflict of laws in these countries and 
proposed harmonised conflicts rules, covering general principles and concepts of conflict of 
laws, jurisdiction, choice of law, recognition and enforcement of judgments. The Asian 
General Principles, however, is primarily an academic work by a group of scholars without 
the involvement of policymakers, governments or judiciary. The Asian General Principles 
                                                          
61 The Principles, “Introduction” para I.20. 
62 The only country that has done so is Paraguay. 
63  Such as countries that have implemented the Regulation (EU) No 593/2008 on the law applicable to 
contractual obligations (Rome I), [2008] OJ L 177/6. 
64 Articles 3 and 6(1)(b). 
65 For more discussion of the Hague Principles, see SC Symeonides, “The Hague Principles on Choice of Law 
for International Contracts: Some Preliminary Comments” (2013) 61 American Journal of Comparative Law 
873. 
66 Japan, the Republic of Korea, Mainland China, the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, Taiwan, 
Vietnam, Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand and Singapore. For more information on this project, see Weizuo 
Chen and Gerald Goldstein, “The Asian Principles of Private International Law” (2017) 13 Journal of Private 
International Law 411. 
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may have limited impact in reality and may not lead to the official regional harmonisation of 
choice of law, in the form of convention, model law or principles. 
Therefore, the choice of law rules primarily rest on the domestic law of individual states. It is 
unfortunate the level of development of domestic choice of law varies largely from country to 
country. Choice of law is well developed in some countries, such as New Zealand and 
Singapore.67 Some other countries have recently updated their domestic choice of law rules. 
China, for example, adopted the new choice of law status, “Choice of Law for Foreign-
Related Civil Relationships Act”, in 2010,68 and the Supreme People’s Court has published 
the first judicial interpretation to this Act in 2012.69 The Chinese domestic choice of law, 
though imperfect, is updated and partially modernised, largely consistent with the 
international best practice. 70 Besides, Albania, 71 Belarus, 72 Bulgaria, 73  Czech Republic, 74 
Poland,75 Serbia,76 Turkey,77 Vietnam,78 etc., have reformed and updated their choice of law 
rules in the past 10 years. Domestic choice of law rules in these countries are generally 
updated, and some of them are clearly influenced by the EU choice of law instruments.79 On 
the other hand, the choice of law in many other countries remains outdated. For example, 
                                                          
67 For comments, see PRH Webb and FM Auburn, “New Zealand Conflict of Laws — A Bird’s Eye View” 
(1977) 26 ICLQ 971; Elsabe Schoeman, “Conflict of Laws” (2013) 2 New Zealand Law Review 301; Peter 
Kincaid, “Rationalising Contract Choice of Law Rules” (1993) 7 Otago Law Review 93. 
68 Order No 36 of the President of the People’s Republic of China. Adopted at the 17th session of the Standing 
Committee of the 11th National People’s Congress on 28 October 2010; entered into force on 11 April 2011. 
69 Supreme People’s Court of China, Interpretations of the SPC on Several Issues Concerning Application of the 
Law of the People’s Republic of China on Choice of Law for Foreign-Related Civil Relationships (I), [2012] Fa 
Shi No 24, adopted at the 1563rd Session of the Judicial Committee of the Supreme People’s Court on 10 
December 2012 and entered into effect on 3 January 2013. 
70 See comments in Zheng Sophia Tang, Yongping Xiao and Zhengxin Huo, Conflict of Laws in the People’s 
Republic of China (Cheltenham: EEL, 2016) Ch 14. 
71 Albanian Law on Private International Law Act of 2011 (Law 10.428 of 2 June 2011); AG Bushati and N 
Dollani, “Albanian PIL Act and Its Implementation in Judicial Practice” (2016) 18 
AnaliPravnogFakultetaUniverziteta u Zenici 147; E Cela and M Qoku, “Contractual Obligations under the 
Private International Law in Albania” (2014) 10 Academicus — International Scientific Journal 181. 
72 Civil Code of Belarus (1998), amended in 2009, arts 1093–1136. 
73 Bulgarian Private International Law Code (Law No 42 of 2005 as amended by Law No 59 2007). 
74 Law No 91 of 25 January 2012 on Private International Law, effective 1 January 2014. 
75 Act of Private International Law of 4 February 2011. 
76 Serbian Ministry of Justice Draft of 20 July 2012 on Private International Law Code. 
77 Law No 5718 of 27 November 2007 adopting the Turkish Code of Private International Law and International 
Civil Procedure. 
78 Civil Code of Vietnam, adopted on 24 November 2015 and entered into force from 1 January 2017. 
79 The EU choice of law instruments clearly influence the domestic law of those Eastern European countries that 
later joined the EU, such as Bulgaria, Estonia, Lithuania, Romania and Slovenia, and other non-EU Eurasia 
countries, such as Armenia, Belarus, Croatia, Korea, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Turkey and Ukraine. See 
Symeonides (n 65 above) p 875, fn 9. 
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Afghanistan,80 Bosnia and Herzegovina,81 Jordan82and Montenegro83 have not updated their 
choice of law legislatures over 40 years. 
Furthermore, although most countries permit the parties to choose the applicable law 
governing their transactions, detailed rules and practice differ. According to a 2015 survey 
done by Allen & Overy,84 although many B&R countries adopt the modern approach to grant 
the parties freedom to choose the foreign law for their commercial contracts,85 some require 
significant connections between the foreign law and the parties or the contract and very 
readily apply local mandatory rules and public policy to prevail foreign law;86 some often do 
not apply the chosen foreign law unless it is connected to the parties or contracts;87 and some 
generally do not respect party autonomy.88 Diversity also exists in the default applicable law, 
the application and concepts of mandatory rules and public policy, and the law governing 
contracts with inequality of bargaining power. Besides, in terms of judicial practice, some 
courts are very inexperienced in applying foreign law and usually will apply local law instead 
although the foreign law is applicable in paper. 89  Relying solely on domestic conflicts 
legislation would not help to improve certainty in cross-border transactions. 
(b) Jurisdiction 
B&R countries are generally lukewarm towards judicial cooperation in preventing the 
conflict of jurisdictions. The Hague Choice of Court Convention 2005, which aims to 
effectively address the conflict of jurisdiction between different courts where an exclusive 
choice of court clause exists and to facilitate enforcement of judgments delivered pursuant to 
such a clause, has been ratified by Singapore and Montenegro, and other 11 B&R countries, 
which are also EU Member States, are bound by the Convention as a result of the EU 
                                                          
80 Civil Code of Afghanistan, arts 3–35 (1977). 
81 [Former Yugoslav] Act of 15 July 1982 on the Resolution of Conflicts of Laws with Laws and Regulations of 
Other Countries in Certain Matters. 
82 Jordanian Civil Code of 1 August 1976. 
83 [Former Yugoslav] Act of 15 July 1982 on the Resolution of Conflicts of Laws with Laws and Regulations of 
Other Countries in Certain Matters. 
84  Allen & Overy, Global Litigation Survey, 2015, available at 
http://www.allenovery.com/SiteCollectionDocuments/Global%20Litigation%20Survey%202015.pdf (visited 26 
May 2017). 
85 For example, Russia, Kazakhstan, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania, 
Georgia, China, Korea, Bangladesh, Jordan, Israel, UAE, Thailand, Sri Lanka, Singapore, Malaysia and New 
Zealand. 
86 For example, Mongolia, Turkmenistan, Iraq, Laos, Macedonia and Indonesia. 
87  For example, Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Bulgaria, Iran, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, India and 
Philippine. 
88 For example, Nepal, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and UAE. 
89 Such as Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, Montenegro, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Laos. 
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ratification.90 China and Ukraine also signed the Convention without ratification.91 If China 
ratifies this Convention, hopefully the ratification of the B&R hub may encourage more B&R 
countries to accede this Convention, which would form the basis to provide judicial 
cooperation in disputes with a valid exclusive choice of court clause. 
As to B&R countries not currently bound by the Hague Choice of Court convention, although 
most would respect choice of court agreements pursuant to their domestic law,92 this is not 
the consistent practice. Some countries do not enforce choice of law agreement choosing 
either home or foreign courts.93 Some countries are only willing to enforce a jurisdiction 
clause choosing the home forum, but not a foreign court, 94  others vice versa. 95  Some 
countries impose additional requirements for the parties’ choice of foreign courts. For 
example, Azerbaijan requires one of the parties to reside in the chosen forum; 96  China 
requires the chosen foreign court to have “practical connections” with the dispute;97 Georgia 
requires one of the parties has domicile, residence or ordinary residence in the chosen 
forum.98 The effectiveness of a home jurisdiction clause is also questioned in some countries. 
For example, in Indonesia, the court may be reluctant to enforce a home jurisdiction unless 
they find substantive connections exist;99 in India, the parties cannot choose the Indian court 
by the agreement alone;100 in Macedonia and Serbia, the court will only take jurisdiction 
upon agreements if one of the parties has Macedonian citizenship;101 in some countries, the 
                                                          
90 Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and 
Slovenia. 
91  For the status of the Hague Choice of Court Convention, see 
https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/status-table/?cid=98 (visited 23 November 2017). 
92 Such as Albania, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Czech Republic, Hong Kong, 
Hungary, Israel, Jordan, Latvia, Lithuania, Mongolia, Montenegro, Myanmar, Poland, Romania, Singapore, 
Slovakia, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan and Turkey. See the Allen & Overy Survey (n 84 above). 
93 For example, Iran, Iraq and Kuwait. 
94 For example, Egypt, Ukraine and UAE. See Allen & Overy Survey, 143; 330; and 332. Saudi Arabia does not 
permit the choice of foreign court to derogate home jurisdiction and its position towards a home jurisdiction 
clause is unclear. See Allen & Overy Survey, 283. In Philippine, the home jurisdiction clause is generally 
allowed, subject to forum non conveniens (Raytheon International v Rouzie Jr [GR No 162894, 26 February 
2008), but the choice of foreign court may not be effective unless treaty obligations exist (Unimasters 
Conglomeration v CA [GR No 119657, 7 February 1997; Santos III v Northwest Orient Airlines [GR No 
101538, 23 June 1992). See Allen & Overy Survey, 266. 
95 For example, Moldova, the Code of Civil Procedure of Moldova, arts 460–462. 
96 Article 450.2 of the Civil Procedure Code of the Republic of Azerbaijan. 
97SPC, Interpretation of the Implementation of the Civil Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China, 
[2015] Fa Shi No 5, art 531. 
98 Allen & Overy Survey, 156. 
99 Allen & Overy Survey, 82; 179; and 222. 
100 Allen & Overy Survey, 177. 
101 Allen & Overy Survey, 224; 290. 
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law is simply unclear and the cases are rarely reported. 102 The effect of a choice of court 
clause is thus unpredictable. 
Furthermore, there is also no regional arrangement preventing concurrent proceedings 
between two B&R courts. Some countries adopt the discretionary doctrine forum non 
conveniens and decline jurisdiction when they find their jurisdiction inappropriate or 
inconvenient. These are mainly countries with common law traditions, such as New Zealand, 
Singapore, Malaysia, Hong Kong, India and Philippines.103 But some civil law countries, 
such as China, have also adopted forum non conveniens in their court practice.104 Anti-suit 
injunctions that restrain a party from suing in a foreign court are also available in some 
common law tradition countries or regions, such as Singapore, New Zealand, India and Hong 
Kong.105 These common law instruments may be unilaterally used to prevent concurrent 
proceedings, but they are utilised in limited countries and the discretionary nature of these 
instruments causes inconsistency and uncertainty. Furthermore, most countries would not 
unilaterally apply lis pendens in favour of a foreign country simply because the foreign court 
is seized first. In China, it has been explicitly stated in the judicial interpretation that China 
will not stay jurisdiction simply to prevent concurrent proceedings. 106  Therefore, proper 
judicial cooperation is largely lacking in jurisdiction and concurrent proceedings are likely to 
exist between most B&R countries. 
(c) International Judicial Assistance 
International judicial assistance refers to the court or authority of a country (requested 
country), upon the request of the competent authority of another country (requesting country), 
to provide support to conduct certain judicial or official activities in its territory, in order to 
                                                          
102 Such as Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Malaysia, Russian and South Africa. See Allen & Overy Survey, 206; 208; 229; 
280; and 304. 
103 Tiong Yeo, “Natural Forum and the Elusive Significance of Jurisdiction Agreements” (2005) Singapore 
Journal of Legal Studies 448; Suzana Muhamad Said and Shamsuddin Suhor, “Forum Non Conveniens in the 
Syariah Court of Malaysia” (2012) 20 Pertanika Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities 111. For India, see 
Modi Entertainment Network v WSG Cricket Pte (2003) 2MLJ 98 (SC); Mayar (HK) Ltd v Owners and Parties 
(2006) 1 Supreme 677. For Philippines case, see Manila Hotel Co v National Labour Relations [GR No 120077, 
13 October 2000], Republic of the Philippines Supreme Court. 
104 SPC of China, Interpretation of the Civil Procedure Law 2017, art 532; Zheng Sophia Tang, “Declining 
Jurisdiction in Chinese Courts by Forum Non Conveniens” (2015) 45 HKLJ 351–372. 
105 For Singapore, see John Reginald Stott Kirkham v Trane US Inc [2009] SGCA 32; New Zealand, see Jonmer 
v Maltexo [1996] 10 PRNZ 119; India, see Cotton Corp of India Ltd v United Industrial Bank Ltd (1983) 4 SCC 
625; Hong Kong, see Ever Judger Holding Co Ltd v Kroman Celik Sanayii Anonim Sirketi [2015] 3 HKC 246 
(first anti-suit injunction issued by Hong Kong court). 
106 SPC of China, Interpretation of Civil Procedure Law 2017, art 533, which states that where both the Chinese 
and foreign courts have jurisdiction, if one party brought the proceedings in the foreign court and the other sued 
in China, Chinese court could take jurisdiction. 
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assist the litigation procedure pending in the requesting country. In practice, it primarily 
includes the assistance provided for service of procedure and taking evidence abroad.107 This 
is an area where cooperation is most promising. The Hague Conference on Private 
International Law has adopted a few judicial cooperation treaties. The Hague Evidence 
Convention has 61 contracting states, 108  31 of which are B&R countries. 109  The Hague 
Service Convention has 72 contracting states,110 31 of which are B&R countries.111 It seems 
that in terms of judicial assistance in cross-border civil litigation procedure, about half of the 
B&R countries have shown interest to develop cooperation with other countries and work 
under the framework of the Hague Conference. Most B&R contracting states of the Hague 
Evidence Convention and the Hague Services Convention rate the general operation of the 
Conventions “Excellent” or “Good”.112 If B&R indeed improves regional connectivity and 
cross-border transactions, other B&R countries would face the natural needs to improve 
cross-border judicial assistance and would have the motive to join the existing judicial 
assistance framework. At the moment, some B&R countries that are not contracting members 
of these Conventions have expressed the interest to accede. For example, New Zealand stated 
that the work was underway on domestic steps to become a party of the Hague Evidence 
Convention, which was deferred due to other competing priorities and resource constrains.113 
Malaysia and Vietnam have studied the Evidence Convention and considered the possibility 
to join.114 Vietnam has also decided to join the Hague Services Convention.115 These two 
                                                          
107 A broad definition of international judicial assistance also includes enforce foreign judgments. The definition 
adopted here does not include judgment recognition and enforcement, which generate special issues and is 
treated separately in the next sub-section. Judicial assistance here only includes judicial supports that relate to 
litigation procedure. 
108 Convention of 18 March 1970 on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters. 
109 Albania, Armenia, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, China, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Macedonia, Hungary, India, Israel, Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Russian 
Federation, Serbia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Turkey, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and 
Kuwait. 
110 Convention of 15 November 1965 on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or 
Commercial Matters. 
111 Albania, Armenia, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, China, Croatia, Czech Republic, Egypt, 
Estonia, Macedonia, Hungary, India, Israel, Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Montenegro, Poland, Moldova, Romania, 
Russian Federation, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sri Lanka, Turkey, Ukraine, Viet Nam, Kazakhstan, Kuwait and 
Pakistan. 
112  HCCH, Ibid., 26. Only Hungary rates the Hague Evidence Convention “satisfactory” due to the slow 
response from some contracting states. HCCH, “Synopsis of Responses to the Questionnaire of November 2013 
Relating to the Hague Convention of 15 November 1965 on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial 
Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters” Info Doc No 1, May 2014, 27. 
113 HCCH, “Synopsis of Responses to the Questionnaire of November 2013 Relating to the Hague Convention 
of 18 March 1970 on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters”, August 2014, Doc Info 
No 2, May 2014, 11. 
114 HCCH, Ibid., 11. 
115  See the Vie Name Response to the HCCH Questionnaire of November 2013 relating to the Hague 
Convention of 15 November 1965 on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil and 
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Conventions could at least serve as the basis to build the regional judicial cooperation in civil 
litigation procedure. 
Besides the support that assists the foreign court litigation proceedings, international judicial 
assistance also includes providing equal access to justice to foreign nationals as domestic 
citizens. Equal access to justice provides the foreign litigants the same access to legal aids as 
domestic parties, removes the requirements for foreign claimants to pay securities and 
ensures foreign nationals may not be personally addressed or detained for other purposes 
when participating in civil proceedings. These are obstacles that would prevent parties from 
accessing to justice in cross-border scenarios. The third Hague judicial or administrative 
cooperation convention, the Access to Justice Convention,116 receives interest from fewer 
countries. This Convention has 28 contracting states, 17 of which are B&R countries.117 It 
obviously is not as popular as the other two judicial assistance conventions, probably because 
some countries do not see this Convention could provide added value compared to domestic 
law, or existing bilateral or multilateral judicial cooperation treaties;118 others may feel it is 
contrary to public interest to offer legal aids to foreigners. Although the Convention 
contracting states would provide reciprocal national treatments to each other’s citizens, 
citizens from other B&R countries cannot receive this treatment and may face extra barriers 
when suing abroad. For example, foreign claimants but not national claimants may still be 
required to pay securities upon the defendant’s request when bringing actions in Croatia,119 
Czech Republic, 120  Hungary, 121  Malaysia, 122  New Zealand, 123  Serbia, 124  Slovakia 125  and 
Russia.126 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Commercial Matters, available at https://www.hcch.net/en/publications-and-
studies/details4/?pid=6042&dtid=33 (visited 24 October 2017). 
116 Convention of 25 October 1980 on International Access to Justice. 
117 Albania, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Macedonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Turkey and Kazakhstan. 
118 For example, Hungary believes matters governed by this Convention are dealt within in EU law or bilateral 
agreements. HCCH, “Synopsis of Responses to the Questionnaire of November 2013 Relating to the Hague 
Convention of 25 October 1980 on International Access to Justice”, Info Doc No 3, May 2014, 11. 
119 Act of Croatia concerning the Resolution of Conflicts of Laws with the Provisions of Other Countries in 
Certain Matters (OG of ex SFRY no 43/82, 72/82, OG no. 53/91), arts 82–85. 
120 Section 11 of the International Private Law of Czech Republic no 91/2012. 
121 Sections 85 and 89 of 1952 on the Code of Civil Procedure (Hungary). 
122 Order 23, 4.1 of the Rules of Court 2012 (Malaysia). 
123 HCCH, “Synopsis of Access to Justice Questionnaire”, 18–19. 
124 Law on Resolving Conflict of Laws with Regulations of Other Countries (Serbia), art 82. 
125 Article 51 of the Law of Slovakia on Private International Law and Procedure (No 97/1963 OJ). 
126 Article 398 of the Civil Procedure Code of Russia. 
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Besides, bilateral judicial assistance treaties also exist. China, for example, has entered into 
bilateral civil judicial assistance treaties with 23 B&R countries.127 All of them provide rules 
to assist extraterritorial service of proceedings, taking evidence abroad and exempt securities. 
Croatia has concluded bilateral agreements with Latvia, Lithuania, Russia, Ukraine and 
Poland.128 Latvia has entered into civil legal assistance treaties with Kyrgyzstan, Russia, 
Moldova, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Belarus, Estonia, Lithuania and Poland. 129  Vietnam has 
entered into bilateral mutual judicial assistance agreements with Slovakia, Russia, China, 
Hungary, Mongolia, Ukraine, Belarus, Poland, Bulgaria, Laos and Kazakhstan. Bosnia and 
Herzegovina has concluded bilateral agreements with 18 B&R countries, including Bulgaria, 
Croatia, China, Czech Republic, Macedonia, Moldova, Mongolia, Hungary, Iraq, 
Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia and Turkey.130 It is likely 
that these bilateral treaties could resolve the difficulty faced by cross-border litigants, at least 
partially. However, from the long run, many small countries, such as Croatia, may find 
concluding a large number of bilateral agreements difficult and impractical in terms of both 
time and available resources.131 Completely relying on bilateral agreements may also result in 
a “network” of bilateral agreements and would increase complexity for individuals and, given 
the content of agreements may differ between each other in details, the conflicts of treaties 
may also arise, causing difficulties in practice. 
(d) Foreign Judgments 
The situation probably is worse in terms of recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. 
At the international level, only the Hague Choice of Court Convention 2005 addresses the 
mutual recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments pursuant to a valid exclusive 
choice of court agreement.132 This Convention only applies to 12 B&R countries.133 A large 
gap is left for cases where there is no valid exclusive choice of court agreement, and where 
                                                          
127 China has entered into 34 bilateral agreements in total. See Tang, Xiao and Huo (n 70 above) p 145. 
128  Eve Jõks, “Some Problems of International Judicial Assistance from an Estonian Perspective” (1999) 
Juridica International IV 80, fn 4. 
129 D Zivtina, “Comparative Study of ‘Residual Jurisdiction’ in Civil and Commercial Disputes in the EU 
National Report for Latvia”, 2, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/civiljustice/news/docs/study_resid_jurisd_latvia_en.pdf (visited 28 May 2017). 
130 More information of bilateral judicial cooperation treaties between B&R countries can be found on the 
HCCH website, available at https://www.hcch.net/en/states/authorities. 
131 Jõks (n 128 above). 
132 Hague Choice of Court Convention 2005 Ch III. 
133 They are Singapore and 11 other B&R countries which are EU Member States, because this Convention was 
ratified by the EU on behalf of its Member States. See Section 3(b). 
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one of the parties is the resident of a non-contracting state of the Hague 2005 Convention. 
The gap covers the majority of cases between B&R countries. 
Other multilateral judgment conventions also exist. For example, the GCC Convention for the 
Execution of Judgments, Delegations and Judicial Notifications of 1996 facilitates reciprocal 
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments between six GCC countries, all of which 
are also B&R countries.134 The Riyadh Arab Agreement for Judicial Cooperation 1983 helps 
free circulation of judgments among 20 Arabian countries, 12 of which are involved in the 
B&R. 135  Both work to make judgments generally enforceable among those signatories, 
subject to a few common conditions. However, these Conventions can hardly be made 
broadly applicable to other B&R countries, because some rules are largely Islamic law based, 
which are not common practice in countries with different culture, religion and tradition. 
Article 30(1) of the Riyadh Arab Agreement provides that recognition and enforcement 
would be declined if it could contradict the principles of Islamic law or the constitution and 
ordre public of the requested country. The principles of Islamic law in economic activities 
may be largely different from common practice in non-Islamic countries. For example, the 
principle of riba prevents charging interests for loans,136 which may render most judgments 
enforcing banking loans unenforceable. There is also a record of the general excessive use of 
the public policy defence by GCC or Riyadh countries.137 
Bilateral agreements may help at some levels. For example, China has entered into 23 
bilateral treaties in international judicial cooperation which facilitates mutual recognition and 
enforcement of civil judgments with B&R countries. 138  However, a clear drawback of 
bilateral agreements is diversity and lack of consistency. Although these agreements 
generally require the contracting states to recognise and enforce each other’s civil judgments, 
subject to a few exemptions, the detailed requirements may differ between different treaties. 
Differences usually exist in the public policy defence. For example, in the China–Poland 
Treaty, recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments may be denied if the recognition 
and enforcement may infringe the principle of law or public policy of the requested 
                                                          
134 Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and UAE. 
135 Jordan, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Iraq, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Kuwait, Lebanon, UAE and Yemen. 
136  MN Siddiqi, Riba: Bank Interest and the Rationale of Its Prohibition (Jeddah, Saudi Arabia: Islamic 
Research and Training Institute, 2004) pp 37–38; N Bremer, “Seeking Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign 
Court Judgments and Arbitral Awards in the GCC Countries” (2016) 37 McGill Journal of Dispute Resolution 
37, 41. 
137 Bremer (n 136 above) p 42. 
138 Poland, Mongolia, Romania, Russia, Turkey, Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Egypt, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, 
Uzbekistan, Vietnam, Laos, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Thailand, Hungary, Singapore, Korea, UAE, Kuwait and 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
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country. 139  This refusal ground does not exist in the Treaty with Mongolia, 140 
Romania,141Bosnia and Herzegovina.142  The same defence is rephrased in China–Russia 
Treaty as that the application to recognise and enforce judgments may be refused if 
recognition and enforcement may harm sovereignty, security and public policy of the 
requested country.143 The phrase of “sovereignty and security” in the China–Russia Treaty is 
more precise and is considerably narrower than the scope of “principle of law” in the China–
Poland Treaty. In the China–Kuwait Treaty, recognition may be refused if the judgment is 
contrary to the law of the requested country, or is contrary to the constitutional principle, 
sovereignty, security and public policy.144 It is unclear how “being contrary to the law of the 
requested country” is interpreted, ie, whether it should refer to the general principle of law or 
the specific legal rules. 
Furthermore, different rules also exit as to the competence/jurisdiction defence. It is normal 
that the application to recognise and enforce foreign judgments may be refused if the 
requesting court has no jurisdiction pursuant to the law of the requested country, for example, 
the China–Romania Treaty provides that the court of origin should have jurisdiction 
“pursuant to the law of the requested country”.145 That means if Chinese court is asked to 
enforce the Romanian judgments, the Romanian court should have jurisdiction under Chinese 
law, and vice versa. The similar rule is also provided in the China–Poland and Mongolia 
Treaties.146 However, the China–Russia Treaty provides that the application can only be 
rejected on the competence ground if the requested court has exclusive jurisdiction over this 
dispute in its law.147 This requirement is substantively narrower than the one provided in 
Poland, Romania and Mongolia treaties. Furthermore, special jurisdiction rules for the mutual 
recognition and enforcement purpose have been provided in some treaties,148 which means 
that if the court of origin wants the judgment to be enforced in the other contracting state, it 
should take jurisdiction pursuant to the treaty rules instead of domestic jurisdiction rules. 
                                                          
139 Agreement between the PRC and Poland on Legal Assistance in Civil and Criminal Matters 1987, art 20(6). 
140 Agreement between the PRC and Republic of Mongolia on Judicial Assistance in Civil and Criminal Matters 
1989, art 18. 
141 Agreement between the PRC and Romania on Judicial Assistance in Civil and Criminal Matters 1991, art 22. 
142 Agreement between the PRC and Bosnia and Herzegovina on Judicial Assistance in Civil and Commercial 
Matters 2012, art 23. 
143 Agreement between the PRC and Russia in Civil and Criminal Matters 1992, art 20(5). 
144 Agreement between the PRC and Kuwait on Judicial Assistance in Civil and Commercial Matters 2007, art 
21(3). 
145 China–Romania Treaty, art 22(2). 
146 China–Mongolia Treaty, art 18(2); China–Poland Treaty, art 20(1). 
147 Article 20(2). 
148 China–Bosnia and Herzegovina Treaty, art 24; China–Kuwait Treaty, arts 18 and 19. 
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The above example shows that although bilateral treaties may in principle remove the legal 
obstacles to enforce foreign judgments rendered by the court of a contracting state, multiple 
bilateral treaties would lead to complexity and confusion. They may also increase the 
compliance cost where the potential traders may have to spend extra efforts to learn those 
rules to truly predict the potential risk of entering into cross-border transactions with partners 
from multiple countries. The situation would become more complicated in the region with 69 
countries, where the network of treaties between those countries could make a labyrinth for 
individuals and practitioners. Furthermore, some B&R countries, such as Thailand, have not 
entered into any international treaties facilitating enforcement of judgments.149  For those 
countries, it would be difficult to take the first move to enter into such an agreement which is 
not traditionally accepted. 
In cases where no treaty obligations exist, the only resort will be national law of the requested 
country. Unfortunately, national law on recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments is 
underdeveloped in most B&R countries. Some countries allow foreign judgments to be 
enforced in principle, subject to certain conditions, such as the court of origin should have 
jurisdiction, the judgment is final, due process is respected, the judgment is not irreconcilable 
with the local procedure, local judgments or other judgments already recognised and enforced 
in the requested country, and the judgment is not contrary to public policy of the requesting 
country.150 However, this practice is not adopted by most B&R countries. In the absence of 
treaties, reciprocity remains an important precondition to enforce foreign judgments in many 
B&R countries.151 But the concept of reciprocity differs between countries. Some may adopt 
                                                          
149 Allen and Overy Survey, 319. 
150 Armenia (Civil Procedure Code art 2476); Belgium (Private International Law Code art 25); Bulgaria (art 
404 of the Code of Civil Procedure); Estonia Code of Civil Procedure ss 621–622; China Hong Kong, Foreign 
Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Ordinance (Cap 319) s 4; Latvia (arts 636–6445 in the Civil Procedure 
Code); Lithuania (Code of Civil Procedure art 811); China Macau (Civil Procedure Code arts 1199 and 1200); 
Macedonia (Law on Private International Law; see T Deskoski, “New Macedonian Private International Law 
Act of 2007” (2008) X Yearbook of Private International Law 441, 458); New Zealand; Poland (Code of Civil 
Procedure arts 1145 ff); Singapore; Slovakia; South Africa. 
151  Azerbaijan (see IBP Inc, Azerbaijan: Business and Investment Opportunities Yearbook) (Washington: 
International Business Publications, Vol 1, 2016) p 150; China (CPL, 281; Supreme Court CPL Interpretation 
art 544); Bangladesh Code of Civil Procedure ss 13 and 44; Bahrain (Civil and Commercial Procedure Law art 
252); Belarus; Croatia; Hungary; Israel; Iraq; Jordan; Kazakhstan; Korea (art 217 of the Civil Procedure Act); 
Kuwait (art 199, Civil and Commercial Procedure Law); Malaysia; Moldova (Civil Procedure Code art 470); 
Oman (Civil and Commercial Procedure Law art 352); Pakistan (ss 13 and 44A of the Civil Procedure Code); 
Philippines; Qatar (Civil and Commercial Procedure Law art 383); Russia; Serbia; Saudi Arabia (art 11 KSA-
EL); Slovenia; Ukraine; UAE. 
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de jure reciprocity;152 some assume reciprocity exists in all cases, unless proved otherwise;153 
other countries may still rely on de facto reciprocity to enforce judgments.154 
The law of some B&R countries is unclear in this point. For example, in Russia, the court 
may presume reciprocity unless proved otherwise, or require evidence to prove de facto 
reciprocity indeed exists.155 Oman, on the other hand, would treat reciprocity not established 
if the law of the other country provides more restrictive terms to enforce foreign judgment.156 
In UAE, although the law has made the enforcement possible based on the reciprocity 
prerequisite, the Dubai Court of Cassation in practice provides very restrictive interpretation 
and makes reciprocity only possible by treaty.157 The courts of other emirates, however, may 
interpret differently and the uncertainty exists.158 In Vietnam, foreign judgments, in theory, 
can be enforced on the reciprocal basis, upon consulting the Ministry of Justice and the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but practitioners are not aware of any successful cases.159 And in 
Saudi Arabia, there is still debate on whether reciprocity can be established other than by 
treaty. 160  Foreign judgments cannot be enforced in Indonesia, Laos, Mongolia, Nepal, 
Tajikistan, Thailand, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan in any circumstances and can only be 
used as evidence in the new trial of the same disputes in the local court.161 
4. Improve Judicial Cooperation in the B&R Region 
(a) International Approach 
The current juridical cooperation in B&R countries is established in a piecemeal, inconsistent 
and unsystematic manner and needs improvement. The international approach is to fully 
utilise the existing international framework. The Hague Conference has adopted a large 
number of international conventions; some have received support from a large number of 
B&R countries.162 Indeed, some countries have not yet joined the Hague conventions, but the 
main reason usually is the lack of resources or the existence of other priorities, instead of 
                                                          
152 Article 252 of the Bahrain Civil and Commercial Procedures Act. Bremer (n 136 above) pp 43–45. 
153 Montenegro, Serbia. See Allen & Overy Survey, 240; 290. 
154 Such as Chinese legal practice. See Tang, Xiao and Huo (n 70 above). But post the commencement of B&R, 
China has relaxed its reciprocity requirements. See Kolmar Group AG Case (2016) Su Yi Xie Wai Ren No 3 
and Nanning Declaration 2017 art 7. For more details, see Section 4. 
155 Allen and Overy Survey, 281. 
156 Bremer (n 136 above) p 52. 
157 Bremer (n 136 above) p 60; Allen & Overy Survey, 333. 
158 Bremer (n 136 above) p 60. 
159 Allen & Overy Survey, 341. 
160 Bremer (n 136 above) p 57. 
161 Allen & Overy Survey, 179; 208; 239; 248; 317; 319; 326. Article 220 of the Economic Procedure Code of 
the Republic of Tajikistan. 
162 Both the Hague Services Convention and Evidence Convention have ratified by 31 Contracting States from 
B&R countries. See the survey in Section 3(c). 
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substantive barriers, such as conflict with domestic law, foreign policy or public interest.163 
These barriers are not difficult to remove. Although with scarce resources governments can 
only care about those issues that are classified “priorities”, the government priority is likely 
to change according to the change of circumstances. 164 The more frequent and intensive 
cross-border relations that are supposed to be supported by the B&R initiative would likely to 
make cross-border judicial cooperation one of the priorities. It may generate governmental 
interest to join not only these popular judicial assistance conventions but also more recent 
initiatives on choice of court agreements and the future judgments projects.165 Furthermore, 
although 30 B&R countries are not Hague Conference members, the increased opening-up 
brought by the B&R initiative may encourage them to become a member, or they still could 
sign individual judicial cooperation conventions as non-members.166 
The weakness is that the existing conventions are generally limited in scope and 
conservative in content. However, the Hague Conference is working hard to fill the 
existing gaps. For example, the Hague Conference is currently resuming the judgment 
project and is likely to adopt a more comprehensive convention governing judgment 
enforcements falling out of the scope of the 2005 Choice of Court Convention. The new 
judgment convention is expected to be completed by the mid of 2019, which will provide 
a new instrument to assist judicial cooperation in B&R countries. 
 
(b) Bilateral Approach 
                                                          
163 HCCH, “Synopsis of Responses to the Questionnaire of November 2013 Relating to the Hague Convention 
of 18 March 1970 on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters”, August 2014, Doc Info 
No 2, May 2014, 11. 
164 The changing circumstances leading to the change of national policy and priority in international relation has 
been discussed in various law and development and international relation papers. See, for example, RM Czarny, 
Sweden: From Neutrality to International Solidarity (Springer, 2018) (discuss how the political and geopolitical 
transformations in Europe lead to the change of foreign policy of Sweden from neutrality to solidarity); D Todic 
and D Dimitrijevic, “Priority Goals in International Co-operation of the Republic of Serbia in the Field of 
Environment and Sustainable Development” (2014) 14 International Environmental Agreements 163 (discuss 
how EU integration of Serbia reshapes Serbia’s environmental priorities). 
165 There have been recent reports of Palestine and Malaysia reducing the level of involvement in B&R project 
primarily due to the concern of growing debt and political challenges of big infrastructure projects. See the 
critical report “Is China’s Belt and Road Working? A Progress Report from Eight Countries” Nikkei Asian 
Review, available at https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Cover-Story/Is-China-s-Belt-and-Road-working-A-
progress-report-from-eight-countries (visited 17 November 2018). However, it does not suggest a failure of 
B&R, or these countries lose interests in the overall commercial opportunities it could provide. Even with 
challenges faced by big infrastructure projects, the B&R would still help improve the openness and cross-border 
interactions in the region. See, eg, “Belt and Road Initiative in Five Years”, available at 
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/world/china-watch/business/belt-and-road-initiative-five-year-achievements/ 
(visited 22 November 2018) (provide data of B&R achievement by September 2018); Sarah Chan, “The Belt 
and Road Initiative: Implications for China and East Asian Economies” (2017) 35 Copenhagen Journal of Asian 
Studies 52 (provide data and analyse the impact of B&R initiative in the region). 
166 For example, Pakistan is not a member of the Hague Conference, but a contracting party of the Service 
Abroad Convention and Child Abduction Convention. 
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The second approach encourages countries to conclude more bilateral and mini-lateral 
judicial cooperation agreements. This would work particularly well in areas not covered by 
any international conventions or in areas where the individual state does not want to make 
commitment to unnecessary enlargement of cooperation or to the rest of the world.167 Some 
developing countries may prefer to take a cautious approach by opening their doors to 
selected countries, which makes their judicial cooperation more under control.168 However, 
bilateral agreements could not provide a comprehensive framework for the regional judicial 
cooperation and would not assist the grand B&R initiative to achieve its full potential. It 
would also be inefficient for countries to enter into too many bilateral conventions. The 
potential “conflict of treaties” problem will continue to exist. It is suggested that joining the 
existing international framework as the optimal option, and bilateral or mini-lateral 
agreements could be relied on to fill the gap of the international framework or to facilitate 
more special or close connections with specific countries. 
(c) National Approach 
Nothing prevents individual countries from updating and modernising their domestic law to 
facilitate cross-border judicial cooperation. Individual countries could adopt more comity and 
cooperation-oriented approach, by removing unnecessary barriers to apply foreign law, 
providing practical assistance to foreign proceedings, and providing more reasonable 
requirements in recognising and enforcing foreign judgments. In the absence of agreements at 
the international level, unilateral improvement of domestic law would act effectively to 
improve cross-border judicial cooperation at the region, even without collaboration of other 
countries. However, the quality, consistency and timeframe of domestic law reform usually 
cannot be guaranteed. 
(d) Regional Approach 
The best approach is the regional approach, which largely relies on the role of China. China 
plays a leading role as the coordinator and investor in the B&R instead of a supervision 
                                                          
167 Many researchers notice the tradition of some countries to prefer bilateral rather than multilateral cooperation 
in international relationship. See T Webster, “Bilateral Regionalism: Paradoxes of East Asian Integration” 
(2007) 25 Berkeley Journal of International Law 434; E Nadelmann, “Unlandering Dirty Money Abroad” 
(1986) 18 Inter-Am L Rev 33, 74 (analysing why some states prefer bilateral to multilateral treaties in exchange 
of evidence); HL Buxbaum, “Territory, Territoriality, and the Resolution of Jurisdictional Conflict” (2009) 57 
Am J Comp L 631, 672 (comments on the United States’ preference for bilateral and ad-hoc cooperation in anti-
trust regulation). 
168 See VK Aggarwal, “Bilateral Trade Agreements in the Asia-Pacific”, in V Aggarwal and S Urata (eds), 
Bilateral Trade Agreements in the Asia-Pacific (New York: Routledge, 2006) Ch 1 (explains the bilateral trade 
agreements from the economic perspective). 
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power to harmonise the law.169 The B&R initiative suggests that China intends to play as a 
rule-maker to lead the formation of international arrangement, instead of a rule-taker to 
simply comply with the existing arrangement.170 However, it is unrealistic for China to lead 
the conclusion of the formal regional conventions to harmonise choice of law, jurisdiction, 
judicial assistance and enforcement of judgments rules. On the one hand, there is no 
institution in the B&R region to facilitate the regional harmonisation.171 On the other hand, 
the regional conventions may overlap with the existing international conventions and cause 
conflict and confusion. China would better lead in an indirect and informal way and may 
promote the regional judicial cooperation by playing as a role model, as a facilitator, as a 
dispute resolution centre and as a sign-poster. 
As a role model, China could actively participate in the formal legislation in cross-border 
judicial cooperation by ratifying international conventions, concluding bilateral treaties or 
updating domestic law. As the hub of the B&R initiative, China’s activity and cooperation 
may form an example and encourage other B&R countries to follow the similar path.172 
China has already signed the Hague Choice of Court Convention in 2017 which shows a big 
step forward. Chinese Supreme Court has also announced the plan to conclude more bilateral 
or multilateral agreements with B&R countries to resolve the problem of conflict of 
jurisdiction and parallel proceedings. 173  Domestic judicial practice has demonstrated 
relaxation of some principles that used to act as barriers to judicial cooperation. For example, 
although reciprocity is still a precondition to enforce foreign judgments in China, Chinese 
courts are more ready to find reciprocity with foreign countries. In 2015, the Chinese 
Supreme Court suggests that China may proactively facilitate the formation of reciprocity 
with other B&R countries by offering judicial assistance to those countries first if those 
                                                          
169 It has been observed by commentators that China intends to deepen economic and trade relationship with 
other Eurasian countries, but is reluctant to establish cooperative mechanism. M Suzuki, “A Rational Approach 
to the Study of International Relations in Asia” in M Suzuki and A Okada (eds), Games of Conflict and 
Cooperation in Asia (Springer: Tokyo, 2017) p 3. 
170 Chao Xi, “From Rule-Taker to Rule-Maker: China’s Changing Roles in Global Banking Regulation” in F 
Weiss and A Kammel (eds), The Changing Landscape of Global Financial Governance and the Role of Soft 
Law (Leiden: Brill, 2015) 312 ff; HS Gao, “China’s Ascent in Global Trade Governance” in C Deere-Birkbeck 
(ed), Making Global Trade Governance Work for Development (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011) 
p 153 ff; S Kennedy and S Cheng (eds), From Rule Takers to Rule Makers: The Growing Role of Chinese in 
Global Governance (2012), available at https://www.ictsd.org/sites/default/files/research/2012/10/the-growing-
role-of-chinese-in-global-governance.pdf (visited 24 Jan 2019). 
171 See the comparison between B&R and EU, supra Section 2(a). 
172 China has been named the role model for many Asia and Africa countries to follow. See B Simfendorfer, The 
New Silk Road (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011) p 92; Y Wei and YN Balasubramanyam, Foreign Direct 
Investment: Six Country Case Studies (Cheltenham: EEL, 2004) p 55. 
173 SPC, “Several Opinion on Providing Judicial Services and Safeguards for the Construction of the ‘Belt and 
Road’ by People’s Courts” (SPC Belt and Road Opinions), [2015] Fa No 9 (最高人民法院关于人民法院为“一
带一路”建设提供司法服务和保障的若干意见) art 6. 
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countries would promise to act reciprocally in the future.174 In 2016, Nanjing Intermediate 
People’s Court recognised and enforced Singaporean judgments based on the fact that 
Singaporean Court had enforced a Chinese judgment in one occasion. 175 In 2017, Wuhan 
Intermediate Court recognised the existence of reciprocity between the United States and 
China for the first time, given the US courts have enforced Chinese judgments in the past.176 
This judgment shows a laudable attitude towards a more friendly and cooperative judicial 
cooperative scheme. 
As a facilitator, China could lead fostering mutual understanding and common interest and 
principles between B&R countries which would indirectly contribute to the collaborative 
judicial practice without formal legislative process. For example, a joint declaration was 
approved at the second China–ASEAN Justice Forum in 2017 (Nanning Declaration), which 
recognised the necessity to reduce parallel proceedings and to mutually recognise and enforce 
judgments. 177 The Nanning Declaration also encourages flexible interpretation of domestic 
law to recognise the presumed reciprocity principle. It suggests that in the absence of 
precedents that refused to enforce judgments of the requesting countries based on the lack of 
reciprocity, it is presumed that reciprocal relationship between the two countries exists. The 
presumed reciprocity doctrine would largely remove the conventional deadlock of the 
reciprocity doctrine and works in a positive manner to improve enforcement of foreign 
judgments in the region without the change of domestic law. Chinese Supreme Court also 
suggests draft sample judicial cooperation agreements to help B&R countries to enter into 
cooperation.178 
As a dispute resolution centre, China has established two International Commerce Courts 
(CICC) in Shenzhen and Xi’an, respectively. 179  The CICCs are specialised tribunals to 
adjudicate important foreign-related commercial disputes to serve the objective and purpose 
of the B&R.180 Simplified rules are adopted in terms of proving foreign law,181 admitting 
                                                          
174 SPC Belt and Road Opinions art 6. 
175 Kolmar Group AG Case (2016) Su Yi Xie Wai Ren No 3. The Singaporean case is Giant Light Metal 
Technology (Kunshan) Co Ltd v Aksa Far East Pte Ltd [2014] SGHC 16. 
176 LIU Li v TAO Li and Tong Wu, Hubei Province Wuhan Intermediate People’s Court, (2015) E Wuhan Zhong 
Minshang Wai Chu Zi No 000026 (申请人刘利与被申请人陶莉、童武申请承认和执行外国法院民事判决
一案民事裁定书, 湖北省武汉市中级人民法院, (2015)鄂武汉中民商外初字第 00026号). 
177 Article 7 of the Nanning Declaration. 
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foreign evidence 182  and using electronic filing system 183  to provide convenience to the 
parties. The geographic locations of the two courts also demonstrate the Chinese ambition: 
Shenzhen locates in Guangdong–Hong Kong–Macau Greater Bay Area and acts as the pivot 
of maritime silk road. Xi’an has intensive commercial interactions with Central and Eastern 
Europe. This is an important leap towards becoming an international commercial litigation 
centre to provide certainty and reliability to private parties in B&R countries. China’s 
increasingly active and supportive role in international judicial cooperation treaties, including 
signing the Hague Choice of Court Agreement, updating domestic law, fostering Nanning 
Declaration would all support the CICCs and cross-border effects of CICC proceedings in 
other B&R countries. However, in order to become a regional dispute resolution centre, 
China need to continuously improve its law and judicial practice, and may need to tackle the 
language barriers to some foreign parties, for example, by considering using English as an 
acceptable language in trial.184 
As a sign-poster, China could provide comprehensive database on the local law of B&R 
countries, which would work as a sign-post for individuals and companies to predict the legal 
consequences of their cross-border activities. In 2017, All China Lawyers’ Association 
launched the Legal Environmental Report on the Belt and Road Countries.185 This Report 
covers comprehensive information on the legal system and environment of 43 B&R 
countries, including the law and regulations on investment, trade, labour and employment, 
environmental protection, intellectual property rights and dispute resolution. 
The regional approach is consistent with the nature and characteristics of the B&R initiative, 
informal, flexible and China-led. It is recognised that the effect of this approach depends on 
the response of other B&R countries. It is too early to provide empirical data on the impact of 
the regional approach. However, there have already been some positive responses to the 
Chinese leadership, from Singapore’s enforcement of Chinese judgments to the ASEAN 
countries’ informal declaration to relax domestic restrictions to enforce foreign judgments. 
Furthermore, as B&R initiative, the regional approach focuses on mutual benefits and gives 
China the role of facilitating these benefits. Other countries’ act is passive and voluntary, 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
181 Ibid., foreign law can be proved by multiple means, including providing the foreign law and its interpretation 
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which is more easily acceptable by participating countries. While some political concerns on 
China’s influence remain, 186  the nature of judicial cooperation in civil and commercial 
matters mainly relates to private rights and individuals’ economic interests and will not 
generate significant political worries. 
 
5. Conclusion 
It is concluded that the success of B&R depends not only on the perspective of countries 
involved but also on the motivation and incentives of individuals and companies who directly 
utilise the infrastructures and participate in investment, trade, transactions and finance 
facilitated by the B&R initiative. Protection of individual’s rights and ensuring access to 
justice in cross-border civil and commercial matters is inevitable to remove legal obstacles to 
individuals. A comprehensive judicial cooperation framework does not exist in the region. 
Judicial cooperation between B&R countries is achieved partially through international 
treaties, partially by bilateral agreements between two individual countries and mostly 
through unilateral domestic law. The status quo, therefore, is extremely complicated, largely 
piecemealed and hardly effective and predictable. 
The situation may be improved by encouraging B&R countries to utilise existing 
international judicial cooperation conventions, enter into more bilateral agreements and 
modernise domestic law. However, all these approaches have their pros and cons. The best 
approach proposed by this article is the regional approach informally led by China. At the 
current stage, many B&R countries are involved in a more passive manner and waiting to see 
what might happen next. It is also understood that many countries in the Central and West 
Asia would not be an active investor though they may benefit from the initiative by other 
means.187 It is China that has initiated this ambitious project and it would be China to take the 
pioneering role to promote judicial cooperation and assist the smooth progress of the project. 
Although China may not have to lead the establishment of regional judicial cooperation 
institutions, China at least could help to ease practice by improving its own legal practice to 
set up examples for other Eurasian countries, encouraging mutual understanding and adopting 
common principles through informal declarations or memorandum, improving the 
functioning of the CICCs and providing information and technical supports. 
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